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Note: The Fair Credit Reporting Act
Businesses that extend credit, sell insurance or offer em-
ployment often attempt to minimize the risk of dealing with
strangers by purchasing information about them from agen-
cies which compile dossiers on individuals containing informa-
tion about their credit rating and personal lives. This prac-
tice presents two problems for the consumer. First, unauthor-
ized disclosure of the sometimes highly personal information
in these files poses a threat to individual privacy. Second, in-
accurate information in the files may result in a denial of credit,
insurance or employment. Given this potential for harm and
abuse, it seems extraordinary that the information reporting
industry was virtually unregulated until April, 1971, when the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) became effective.' This note
will describe the information reporting industry and the con-
sumer problems created by it, analyze the FCRA to evaluate how
it deals with these problems and suggest several interpretative
rulings and amendments to the Act that could improve its
already substantial consumer protection without great expense
or major departures from its present design.
I. THE INDUSTRY AND ITS PRODUCT
Within the information reporting industry there are two
distinct types of reporting agencies that Congress sought to reg-
ulate through the FCRA.2  The first is the retail credit bureau
1. Fair Credit Reporting Act [hereinafter FCRA or the Act], 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970). Prior to the FCRA only Oklahoma regu-
lated the reporting industry to a significant extent. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, §§ 81-85 (1971). Other states have recently moved to regulate
the industry. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1691 to 1696 (Supp. 1971);
CAL. CIV. CODE tit. 1.5, §§ 1750-57 (West Supp. 1972); MAss. GEN. LAws
A-N. ch. 93, §§ 50-65 (Supp. 1971); N.VL STAT. ANx. §§ 50-18-1 to
18-8 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 370-376 (McKinney Supp.
1971). For a comparison of certain state requirements and the require-
ments of the FCRA, see notes 78 and 129 infra.
2. While the FCRA is aimed primarily at commercial agencies, it
does regulate non-profit agencies as well. See FCRA § 1681a (f). Among
these are non-profit organizations which assemble blacklists of their
political enemies and circulate these to employers with the aim of deny-
ing employment to all such persons. During hearings in the House,
concern was voiced about the activities of the Church League of Amer-
ica, an ultra-rightwing group that offers employers lists of "radicals,
socialists, revolutionaries, communists, and troublemakers of all sorts."
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or consumer credit reporting service which furnishes informa-
tion on the credit-worthiness of individuals to credit-grantors.
3
The second of these institutions is investigatory in nature and
prepares very comprehensive dossiers on the personal lives of
individuals for insurance companies or prospective employers.
The credit bureaus tend to be small businesses serving only one
community or area, but there are a few national credit agencies
holding computerized files on millions of consumers. 4 Even the
small local credit bureaus have access to millions of files through
a nationwide cooperative information exchange maintained by
their trade association, Associated Credit Bureaus of America.5
The investigatory agencies are generally large national opera-
tions with offices in many cities and large staffs of investiga-
tors.6 It has been estimated that in the combined files of all the
credit and investigatory agencies dossiers exist on over 100 mil-
lion consumers.7
The two types of information reporting agencies supply dif-
ferent kinds of information. Credit bureau reports are gener-
ally limited to a credit history of the individual which consists
of information on existing credit obligations and payment per-
formance as well as public record information concerning ar-
rests, indictments, suits, liens, outstanding judgments, marriage
and divorces. 8 The reports available from the investigatory agen-
cies are much more comprehensive and include a great deal of
information about the subject's personal life. An investiga-
tory report gathered for insurance purposes may include infor-
mation on the subject's drinking habits, morals, hobbies and
even the tidiness of his yard and home.9 Comments from
neighbors and acquaintances about the subject are also included
Hearings on H.R. 16340 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 65
(1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
3. The retail credit bureaus are distinguished from the mercan-
tile agencies that supply information regarding businesses. The most
familiar of the mercantile agencies is Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.
4. One of the largest, TRW Credit Data, has computerized files
on 37,000,000 Americans. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 165.
5. Id. at 72. ACB claims to have some 2,100 members.
6. The largest. Retail Credit Company of Atlanta, employs
7000 investigators. Id. at 628.
7. Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal
Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEXAs L. REv. 837, 839 (1971).
8. Hearings on S. 823 before the Subcomm. on Financial Institu-
tions of the Senate Banking and Currency Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
91 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
9. Id. at 278-87.
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in investigatory reports.10
The information purchased from these agencies is not al-
ways reliable. The most fertile source of inaccuracies is public
record information." Such information is difficult to keep cur-
rent because official records often do not record the final dispo-
sition of legal matters, or the filing of final dispositions may be
unavailable for inspection because of inadequate judicial record-
ing systems.12 In addition to the problems inherent in record-
ing from public records, the agencies frequently make reporting
errors by confusing records of people with the same name.13
A second source of inaccurate information is personal in-
terviews with neighbors or other persons concerning the sub-
ject's personal life. These interviews in many cases provide in-
formation which is nothing more than gossip, and often no at-
tempt is made to determine the reliability of such information.
The heavy workload of many investigators virtually precludes
careful gathering and verification of consumer information.15
Moreover, the format of the report does not distinguish gossip
from more reliable information and thus may encourage the ac-
ceptance of gossip as fact.
I. CONSUMER PROBLEMS PRIOR TO THE FCRA
Prior to the FCRA the individual harmed by false or inac-
curate information reported by a credit bureau or investigatory
agency or by unauthorized disclosure of private information in
his dossier was generally unable to recover his losses. The
agency's duties to the consumer were very limited, and few
legal theories were helpful in obtaining a judgment against it.'
Moreover, reporting agencies were not required to notify
the consumer that a report on him existed or was being sup-
plied to a third party. Neither was there a duty on the user of
a report to notify the subject if the report were the basis for a
denial of credit or other benefit. Many agencies contractually
prohibited the user from disclosing the source of its consumer
10. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 186.
11. A governor's task force arrived at this conclusion after studying
the problems of the consumer reporting industry in California. Id.
at 130.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 399.
15. Id.
16. See text accompanying notes 24-26 and 33-35 infra.
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reports, and some agencies further required that the user agree
not to disclose that it was using consumer reports.17 This se-
crecy resulted in some individuals being denied employment or
other benefits over a period of years without knowledge of the
source of their difficulties.1 8 Even if an individual learned of
the existence of a file and requested that the agency disclose
the information it was reporting to third parties, the agency
was under no legal obligation to comply. Some agencies made
it a formal policy never to discuss with the subject informa-
tion contained in his file.' 9
Even if the reporting agency disclosed to the subject the
contents of its report, additional problems existed. Agencies
willing to delete false or misleading information balked at send-
ing the amended report to all who had previously used the
erroneous report. 20 Another common problem involved disputed
claims. A credit report might show that a consumer had not
paid for an item but not report that the bill went unpaid be-
cause the merchandise was defective and the merchant refused
to repair it. 21 Prior to the FCRA a consumer could not require
the reporting agency to note on his report that a debt was dis-
puted or an explanation of his nonpayment. This lack of a right
to comment on disputed claims or information was especially
serious when reports used by employers and insurers contained
hearsay, gossip or unverified comments about the subject's
personal life. Not only were agencies under no duty to permit
the subject of the report to reply to such comments, but they
generally refused even to reveal the source of the disputed in-
formation. 22 Thus one victimized by false and malicious infor-
mation in such a case was wholly unable to discover who his
accusers were, much less reply to them.
A further problem involved the reporting of accurate but
outdated information. Adverse information from the distant past
is a poor measure of current credit-worthiness or reliability,
17. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 189.
18. One salesman was unable to learn what was blocking advance-
ment in his career for over five years. Only after a friend ignored a
contract obligation of secrecy with the investigatory agency supplying
pre-employment reports did the salesman learn that he was unable to
hold a good job because of an erroneous report that, among other things,
he had been dishonorably discharged from military service. House
Hearings, supra note 2, at 78-81.
19. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 185.
20. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 81.
21. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 93.
22. Id. at 185.
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but in many cases such information was on file and reported.23
Since the information was factual, there was little the subject
of the report could do, there being no obligation on the report-
ing agency to discard possibly obsolete information.
Aggravating this situation was the inability of a person in-
jured by a false or misleading report to recover damages in a
defamation action. Virtually every jurisdiction recognized the
doctrine that reports furnished in good faith to parties having a
legitimate interest in the information reported possess a quali-
fied privilege which is not lost simply because the report con-
tains some inaccurate or defamatory matter.24  The consumer
injured by such a report could defeat the privilege only by show-
ing that the report had been furnished out of malice or sup-
plied to persons with no legitimate interest in the informa-
tion.2 5 Since these facts were usually absent, the agencies were
effectively insulated from liability for defamation..2 0
Threats to an individual's privacy also existed because the
confidentiality of these highly personal dossiers was often not
adequately safeguarded. While the stated policy of most firms
was to furnish information only to those who had a legitimate
business reason for requesting the information,2 7 the firms did
not utilize effective procedures to prevent those with other mo-
23. Id. at 431-32.
24. See, e.g., Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, 194 F.2d 160(D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952). For an exhaustive
listing of those jurisdictions that have considered the question and ex-
tended the privilege, see Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Re-
ports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1050 nn. 86 & 87 (1971). See also Smith,
Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies-MacIntosh v. Dun, 14
COLmVL L. REV. 187 (1914).
In the United States, only Georgia and Idaho have withheld the
privilege. Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886); Pacific Pack-
ing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 P. 1007 (1914). The privi-
lege has been rejected in England. Macintosh v. Dun [1908] A.C. 300
(P.C.).
25. See, e.g., Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, 194 F.2d 160
(D.C. Cir. 1952).
This is a broad statement of possible abuses that would defeat the
conditional privilege. For a more detailed treatment, see W. PlossEn,
ThE LAw or ToRTs 819-33 (4th ed. 1971).
26. One commentator has suggested that plaintiffs would have a
better chance of recovery for injuries resulting from false or defama-
tory statements if they employed a products liability tjheory rather than
the defamation theory. Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Re-
ports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1054-61 (1971).
27. This policy is formulated in the Associated Credit Bureaus'
Guidelines for Protection of Privacy. Senate Hearings, supra note 8,
at 143. Acceptance of the Guidelines is a condition of membership in
the ACB. Id. at 146.
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tives from gaining access to the files.28  For example, many
firms allowed local police, as well as the F.B.I. and the Internal
Revenue Service, to use their files as an aid in law enforce-
ment.29  Some agencies sold mailing lists of their best credit
risks"° and distributed "preventative bulletins" on delinquents. 1
Also, some politicians obtained credit bureau dossiers on their
opponents in the hope of discovering damaging information that
could be used against them in election campaigns.A2
Though such practices threatened the individual's right
of privacy, established legal doctrines generally foreclosed recov-
ery on an invasion of privacy theory. Where information about
an individual's private life has not been widely disseminated,
several jurisdictions have held that there is no invasion of pri-
vacy.33 Furthermore, an action for invasion of privacy has
been subject to the conditional privilege that makes recovery in
defamation so difficult.34 If the user of the files has a legitimate
interest in the information, the communication to him of even
highly personal information has been privileged.3 5
28. CBS News tested the security measures of the agencies in a
much-publicized experiment. CBS established a fictitious business
unit, Transitair Systems, which consisted of nothing more than a mailing
address, a telephone answering service and some letterhead stationery.
Transitair sent requests for credit reports on certain individuals to
20 credit bureaus in different parts of the country. Despite the state-
ment of an industry spokesman to CBS that it is impossible for unau-
thorized parties to gain access to credit reports, 10 of the 20 credit
bureaus Transitair (CBS) contacted sent credit reports. Other credit
bureaus offered to supply information if Transitair would sign a con-
tract. Only two of the 20 bureaus referred Transitair to a New York
credit bureau for a check of credentials, the approved practice under
the industry guidelines. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 59-61.
29. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 149, 161.
30. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 36-37.
31. The American Hotel and Motel Association was concerned that
the FCRA would interfere with the practice of distributing "protective
bulletins" of skippers, con men, and bad check artists. Id. at 614. Such
bulletins are permissible under Interpretation II, Federal Trade Com-
mission Proposed Interpretations under Fair Credit Reporting Act,
37 Fed. Reg. 4983 (1972) (announced March 8, 1972; effective May 8,
1972). Distribution of lists of bad credit risks as opposed to lists of
those who have violated criminal laws is not permitted. Id. For the
status of such an interpretation, see note 47 infra.
32. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 209.
33. Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (1962); Gregory
v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943).
34. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
216 (1890).
35. Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (DS.C. 1966);
see Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a
Remedy, 57 GEO. L.J. 509, 523-27 (1969).
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IlI. CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE FCRA
The stated purpose of the FCRA is to ensure that informa-
tion supplied by reporting agencies is furnished in a manner
"which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to
the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization
of such information. ..."6 To accomplish this purpose the Act
(1) Requires that the agencies follow reasonable proce-
dures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the
information they report;3 7
(2) Requires that the consumer be notified when a con-
sumer report is the basis of a decision to deny credit
or another benefit; 38
(3) Grants the consumer the right to learn what is in his
file;3 9
(4) Requires that inaccurate information be deleted from
a file and disputed information be reported as such
with a statement of the consumer's side of the dis-
pute;40
(5) Requires that obsolete information be removed from
consumer reports;4 1
(6) Requires advance notice and other special measures
of protection when a report will involve interviews
with friends and others concerning the subject's per-
sonal life;42
(7) Prohibits furnishing a consumer report except with
the consumer's permission or for specified legitimate
purposes; 43
(8) Provides a private cause of action for non-compliance
with the requirements of the act and criminal penal-
ties for certain violations of the act.4 4
The administrative agency primarily responsible for en-
forcement of the Act is the Federal Trade Commission; 45 viola-
36. FCRA § 1681(b).
37. FCRA § 1681e(b).
38. FCRA § 1681m(a).
39. FCRA § 1681g.
40. FCRA § 16811
41. FCRA § 1681c.
42. FCRA § 1681d.
43. FCRA § 1681b.
44. FCRA §§ 1681o, c, & r.
45. FCRA § 1681s(a). The following agencies have enforcement
obligations in the cases specified in FCRA § 168Is(b): the Comptroller
1972]
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tion of the FCRA is an unfair trade practice under Section 5(a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.40  Since the Federal
Trade Commission was not granted rule-making authority un-
der the FCRA, its interpretations of the compliance obliga-
tions of the industry under the Act constitute only advisory opin-
ions.47  However, the Commission may initiate corrective ac-
tion for failure to comply with the Act as interpreted in these
advisory opinions. 48
A. SCOPE OF THE FCRA
Compliance with the FCRA is mandatory for those who sup-
ply and use "consumer reports." A "consumer report" is defined
as
any written, oral, or other communication of any information
by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which
is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in
part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the
consumer's eligibility for (1) credit or insurance to be used
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, or (2)
employment purposes, or (3) other purposes authorized under
Sections 1681b .... 49
of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, Board of Directors of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration, Interstate
Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board and the Secretary of
Agriculture.
46. FCRA § 1681s(a).
47. There are two sources of such advisory opinions. First, in-
terpretations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act are published in the
Federal Register. Such interpretations are not substantive rules and do
not have the force of law. They are advisory in nature and compar-
able to "industry guides," representing "the Commission's view" of how
the FCRA should be interpreted and what it requires. FTC Proced-
ures and Rules of Practice, Subpart H, § 1.73, 36 Fed. Reg. 9294
(1971). Second, staff interpretations are issued in response to in-
dividual requests for guidance. These represent "informal staff opinion"
rather than "the Commission's view" (id. at § 1.72), but it is un-
certain that any practical consequences turn on this difference. A
large number of these staff interpretations rendered in the period from
November, 1970, to April, 1971, have been codified in a pamphlet titled
"Compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act." The pamphlet is
reprinted at 4 CCH CONSUMER CrrDrr Gums 1 11,301 (1971).
48. The Federal Trade Commission has issued this warning only
with respect to Interpretations published in the Federal Register
(FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice, Subpart H, § 1.73, 36 Fed.
Reg. 9294 (1971) ), but presumably the Commission might initiate cor-
rective action if a staff interpretation were ignored. See note 47 supra
for the distinction between Interpretations published in the Federal
Register and staff interpretations.
49. FCRA § 1681a(d).
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It should be noted that a report need not be derogatory to fall
within this definition. It is sufficient that the report contains
information relating to the subjects listed in the definition and
that the information is collected or used for one of the pur-
poses specified. A major limitation on the scope of the Act is
created by excluding from the definition any credit or insur-
ance report sought for business rather than personal or family
purposes.50
Certain reports that meet the definitional requirements of a
"consumer report" are expressly excluded by the statute,5 1 the
most important exclusion being reports of "trade experience"
or "ledger experience." A report containing information "solely
as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the
person making the report" is not considered a "consumer report"
subject to the FCRAA52  For example, if merchant A asks mer-
chant B for information on consumer C, the reporting by B
of his credit experience with C is not a consumer report. How-
ever, if B goes beyond his own trade experience and relates in-
formation about C's dealings with other merchants or credi-
tors, his report constitutes a consumer report subject to the
FCRA.53 Exclusion of "trade information" reports from FCRA
regulation is premised on the belief that a report based solely
on a merchant's personal experience with a consumer is likely to
be reliable.54
50. It is clear that the Act does not apply to reports used to estab-
lish eligibility for business credit or business insurance. Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 8, at 16-17; FTC Advisory Opinion, 4 CCH CoNsuMns
CREnrr GuiD 11,314 at 59,811-12 (1971) (Question 3). Cf. Anony-
mous v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 40 U.S.L.W. 2162 (N.Y. Sup. CL, Sept.
14, 1971), which held that although the FCRA's ban on reporting ob-
solete information (FCRA § 1681c) applies only to credit reports on
individuals, the public policy embodied in the Act warranted an in-junction against publication of a 24-year-old criminal conviction in a
credit report on a corporation solely owned by the individual who had
been convicted.
51. FCRA § 1681a (d) (A) - (C).
52. FCRA § 168la(d) (A).
53. FTC Advisory Opinion, 4 CCH CoNsumEm CREDrT GuM- 9 11,312,
at 59,804 (1971).
54. See Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 62 (explanation of a simi-
lar exclusion in a proposed New York statute regulating credit reporting
agencies).
There are two other exclusions from the definition of "consumer
report." An authorization of a specific extension of credit by an issuer
of a credit card is not a "consumer report" subject to the FCRA. FCRA
§ 1681a (d) (B). Also, when a third party requests a prospective creditor
to advance credit to a consumer, the creditor's report is not a "con-
sumer report" that creates disclosure obligations for the third party
19721
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The scope of the FCRA is further restricted by the fact that
only "consumer reporting agencies" are subject to the Act." A
"consumer reporting agency" is defined as a person or agency
that gathers information for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties. 56 Department stores and other large-
scale grantors of credit maintain extensive credit information
files and many initiate credit investigations, but this informa-
tion is exclusively for their own use and is not furnished to
third parties. Thus they are not "consumer reporting agencies"
and their reports are not "consumer reports" subject to the
Act.57 However, these businesses are subject to certain require-
ments of the Act if they purchase and use consumer reports
prepared by others.58
B. REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLE PROCEDURES TO ENSURE ACCURACY
Agencies subject to the FCRA are required to follow "rea-
sonable procedures" to assure "maximum possible accuracy" of
the information furnished in consumer reports. " The Act itself
does not specify the precise procedures agencies should employ
to comply with this requirement, but the FTC has published an
advisory opinion interpreting this requirement.0° The FTC
states that agencies can no longer require quotas of adverse
information from investigators since this practice seems incon-
sistent with "maximum possible accuracy." Verification of ad-
verse information by more than one source is recommended
to improve accuracy. Agencies are also urged to periodically re-
so long as the consumer is given the name and address of the prospec-
tive creditor and the prospective credit makes the required disclosures
upon use of such reports. FCRA § 1681a(d) (C).
The rationale for excluding the middleman in these transactions--
the merchant who checks the credit card with the issuer and the third
party who puts a consumer in touch with a lender-seems to be that
he acts only as a conduit; he does not make the decision to extend
credit but merely puts the consumer in touch with a party who might
do so. Since the middleman does not make decisions affecting the
consumer, he is not obligated to comply with the Act in such transac-
tions. For the source of the "conduit" analysis, see Senate Hearings,
supra note 8, at 62 (explanation of similar exclusions in a proposed
New York statute regulating credit reporting agencies).
55. FCRA § 1681a(d).
56. FCRA § 1681a(f).
57. FTC Advisory Opinion, 4 CCH CONSUMm CRriT Gums ff 11,311,
at 59,803 (1971).
58. See text accompanying note 61 infra.
59. FCRA § 1681e(b).
60. 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 11,306 at 59,790 to 91 (1971).
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evaluate information on file to determine whether or not it has
become obsolete or misleading. The agencies are further advised
to indicate on the report the purpose for which information was
originally gathered in order to minimize the risk of inaccu-
rate interpretation when used subsequently for a different pur-
pose. Special care must be taken by those agencies which use
automatic data processing equipment and mechanical data trans-
mitters to prevent errors caused by equipment malfunction.
C. Tim NOTICE REQumEm=
The FCRA imposes a notice obligation on the user of con-
sumer reports. If adverse action on a consumer's application
for credit, insurance, employment or another benefit is based
in whole or in part on a consumer report, the user of the re-
port must so notify the consumer and disclose the name and ad-
dress of the agency that supplied the report.01 This notice re-
quirement should greatly aid persons victimized by inaccu-
rate consumer reports of which they would otherwise have no
knowledge, who prior to the FCRA might have been denied em-
ployment or other benefits without explanation over a period
of years because of such reports.62
However, there is a serious loophole in this notice require-
ment. The obligation to give notice would not arise where the
user merely orders a report, reads it, but then makes his ad-
verse decision on other grounds such as an application form
completed by the consumer. Thus users who wish to avoid the
trouble and expense of notifying a consumer as required could
claim their adverse decisions were based on factors independent
of the consumer reports.63 This simple technique for avoiding
the notice requirement poses a serious threat to consumers be-
cause notice is a prerequisite to adequate protection of their
rights under the FCRA. Only when the consumer has notice
that his file exists will he be able to exercise his rights to
learn the contents of his file and have inaccuracies corrected. 4
This loophole in the notice requirement could be eliminated
61. FCRA § 1681m(a).
62. See note 18 supra.
63. The obligation to notify arises when an adverse decision is
based "wholly or partly" on a consumer report. FCRA § 168Imm(a).
This claim by the user would therefore be an assertion that his deci-
sion was not even "partly" based on the report.
64. FCRA §§ 1681g & i.
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in either of two ways. First, the Act could be amended to pro-
vide that where a report has been ordered and there is a deci-
sion adverse to the subject of the report, the user must notify
the consumer of the report whether or not it was the basis of the
adverse decision. A second and simpler method of dealing with
this problem would be to place upon the user, in unfair trade
practice proceedings against him, the burden of proving that
he did not rely on consumer reports in making his decisions.0 5
A formal announcement of this policy by the FTC would dis-
courage circumvention of the notice requirement and encourage
report-users to send notices in more cases. This would not be
unduly burdensome since the user's only obligation would be
to notify the consumer of the name and address of the agency
supplying the report; 66 he would not be subject to the agency's
obligation to reinvestigate disputed items and correct inac-
curacies.67
However, even compliance with the literal terms of the Act's
notice requirement appears insufficient. Although such com-
pliance would inform the consumer of the name and address of
the agency which supplied his report, the Act does not require
the user to advise the consumer of his right to discover the con-
tents of his file and correct inaccuracies. The sample notifica-
tion forms the FTC has published with its advisory opinions
do include a statement advising the consumer of his rights, 8
and presumably, failure to so inform the consumer in this
notification could result in corrective action by the FTC. 0
65. The burden on the user of reports could be a burden of going
forward with evidence or a burden of proof or persuasion. Authority
for imposing on the user a burden of going forward can be found in
FCRA § 1681s(a), which grants the FTC power to issue "procedural
rules" in enforcing compliance with the Act. Also, the power to impose
this procedural burden arguably is inherent in the grant of adjudicatory
power to the FTC. The FTC's authority to place the burden of proof or
persuasion on the report-user who engages in the practice of ordering
reports but not notifying consumers is suggested by an examination of
the FTC's use of "trade regulation rules," 16 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1972). If a
trade regulation rule is relevant to an issue in an adjudication, the
Commission may rely on it to settle the issue, provided only that
the respondent must be given a hearing on the applicability of the rule.
16 C.F.R. § 1.12(c) (1972). This suggests that the Commission has the
power to absolutely foreclose an argument on the merits on certain is-
sues; a fortiori the Commission could place the burden of proof on re-
spondent.
66. See FCRA § 1681m(a).
67. FCRA § 1681i.
68. 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE fT 11,319 (1971).
69. See note 48 supra.
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D. CoNsUIN 's RiGHT TO AccESS TO His Fir
The consumer has the right to learn the "nature and sub-
stance" of all information in his file.7 0 The reporting agency
must also disclose the sources of the information, although
there are some limitations on this requirement where "investi-
gative consumer reports" are concerned." Finally, the reporting
agency must disclose to whom it has supplied the report in the
preceding six months, or in the preceding two years if employ-
ment was concerned.72  Given access to his file, the consumer
can determine if there are inaccuracies, the cause of any inac-
curacy and the extent to which the inaccurate information has
circulated and harmed him. This information is necessary to
the consumer's effort to repair the damage that an erroneous
report may have caused. Prior to the FCRA the right to discover
such information was not generally recognized.
The FCRA provides that the consumer must give "reason-
able notice" to the agency if he desires an interview concerning
his files,7 3 but the FTC has advised that this requirement should
not be used as an excuse to make it difficult for the consumer
to exercise his rights.7 4 Nevertheless, some agencies continue
to discourage consumers who seek access to their files despite
the clear requirement of the FCRA.7  Common tactics are to
inform the consumer that his file is in another office for process-
ing or that the employee who handles disclosures is on va-
cation. The consumer is told to come back later if he wants to
see his file. These tactics clearly are in conflict with the FTC's
interpretation of the requirements of the Act and could result in
the initiation of corrective action by the FTC. 0
70. FCRA § 1681g(a) (1). The "nature and substance" language
was used to indicate that the consumer does not have a right to possess
or read the actual file. Consumers were denied this right because the
industry feared consumers would try to destroy their files if they could
possess the actual file. House Hearings, sUpra note 2, at 145. The
"nature and substance" language is used only to make clear the agency's
right to refuse to turn the actual file over to the consumer; the language
should not be used as an excuse to withhold information from the
consumer.
The only information the Agency may withhold is medical in-
formation. FCRA § 1681g(a) (1).
71. FCRA § 1681g(a) (2). Sources consulted in the preparation of
an "investigatory consumer report" need not be disclosed except pur-
suant to discovery procedures in an action brought under this Act
72. FCRA § 1681g(a) (3).
73. FCRA § 1681h(a).
74. 4 CCH CoNsuZVmR CREDrr Gums 11,306 at 59,795 (1971).
75. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 6 (Midwest ed.).
76. See note 48 supra.
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E. INACCURATE An DispuTED INFORMATION
If a consumer disputes the accuracy or completeness of an
item in his file, the consumer reporting agency must reinvesti-
gate and record the current status of the information." In most
cases the investigation must be made immediately. 8 Should the
information be found inaccurate or unverifiable it must be de-
leted from the consumer's file.79 If reinvestigation does not re-
solve the dispute to the consumer's satisfaction, he may file a
statement up to 100 words in length explaining the dispute.80
Any subsequent reports must clearly note any disputed item
and include the consumer's statement or an accurate summary
of it.81 Finally, the agency is required to inform the consumer
of his right, upon request, to have the amended report resub-
mitted to those who have used the erroneous report within the
preceding six months, or the preceding two years if the report
was for employment purposes.8 2
These provisions should greatly aid the consumer denied
credit or another benefit because of an inaccurate report. Us-
ing these procedures he can have the inaccuracy rectified and
the corrected report recirculated to those who relied on the inac-
curate version. The consumer's right to briefly explain a dis-
puted item of information should prove especially valuable.
Prior to the FCRA, unscrupulous merchants coerced payment for
defective merchandise by threatening to report nonpayment to a
credit bureau and thereby ruin the consumer's credit rating.
This threat should be partially obviated by the consumer's right
to add an explanation to his report citing legitimate reasons for
nonpayment.
77. FCRA § 1681i(a). However, the agency need not reinvesti-
gate if it has reason to believe the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant. Id.
78. The statute requires that the reinvestigation be within a "rea-
sonable period." Id. The FTC has advised that it would be "appro-
priate" to begin the investigation immediately unless there is a good
reason for delaying. 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GIDE 11,306 at 59,795
(1971). ARiz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 44-1946D (Supp. 1971) provides an
incentive for the agencies to reinvestigate immediately. If the agency
has not completed its investigation within 15 days of receiving a no-
tice of inaccuracy, the agency must correct the item in its records as
requested by the consumer and give notice of the correction to those
who have previously received the uncorrected report.
79. FCRA § 1681i(a).
80. FCRA § 1681i(b).
81. FCRA § 1681i(c). This is not required if the agency has rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the statement is frivolous or irrelevant.
Id.
82. FCRA § 1681i(d).
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F. PROTECTION FROM OBSOLETE INFORMATION
Except for a consumer's bankruptcy, which may be reported
for 14 years, adverse information more than seven years old
may not be used by a consumer reporting agency.83 Additional
protection from obsolete information is provided where adverse
public record information is provided to a potential employer.
In such a case, the reporting agency must either notify the con-
sumer that public record information is being reported to the
prospective employer or maintain strict procedures to verify
the current status of the information.8 4 Special procedures
were considered necessary here for two reasons. First, it
is difficult to adequately maintain the current status of public
record information, and second, the nature of the employment
decision is such that irreparable harm to a vital interest of
the consumer may result from a denial of employment based
on inaccurate information.8 5
G. SPECIAL MEASURES FOR INVESTIGATIVE CONSUMER REPORTS
An investigative consumer report is a report in which infor-
mation on the consumer's reputation, character and personal
habits is obtained through personal interviews with friends,
neighbors and others who have had some acquaintance with
the subject of the report.88 In the case of the ordinary con-
sumer report, the consumer is notified of its existence only if
he is adversely affected by its use.8 - However, where an investi-
gative consumer report is concerned, the consumer has a right
to notice that such a report is being prepared 8 and may request
disclosure of the nature and scope of the intended investi-
gation.8 9 To further protect the subjects of such reports the
FCRA requires that adverse information in an investigatory
report may not be used in a subsequent report unless it has
been reverified or has been on file no more than three months.9 0
83. FCRA § 1681c (a) (1) -(6). These obligations to delete obsolete
information do not apply where credit or life insurance in the amount
of $50,000 or more is concerned, or where an employment opportunity at
a salary of more than $20,000 a year is concerned. FCRA § 1681c(b)
(1)-(3).
84. FCRA § 1681k(1)-(2).
85. See text accompanying notes 126-27 infra.
86. FCRA § 1681a(e).
87. FCRA § 1681m(a).
88. FCRA § 1681d(a) (1).
89. FCRA § 168ld(b).
90. FCRA § 16811.
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Such additional protection is necessary here because investi-
gatory reports involve large-scale invasions of individual pri-
vacy. The individual faced with the prospect of such an investi-
gation should have an opportunity to decide whether credit,
insurance, or other benefits are sufficiently important to sacri-
fice his privacy. Notification that an investigation will be con-
ducted gives the consumer an opportunity to decide if he
wants to pay this price. If he does not, he can withdraw his ap-
plication and there will be no investigation.'"
It has been suggested that a system which forces the con-
sumer either to forego credit or other benefits, or to accept a
large-scale intrusion into his personal life is not ideal from
the consumer's viewpoint.'" It is argued that restrictions are
necessary on the areas of personal life that can be subjected
to investigation for any of these purposes.9 3 The feasibility of
adding such restrictions to the FCRA is considered later.4
H. SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY
Except in response to a court order or the subject's request,
a consumer report may be furnished only to those intending to
use it for credit, insurance or employment purposes, or in a de-
termination of the consumer's eligibility for a government li-
cense, or for other legitimate business purposes.9 5 Government
agencies seeking access to consumer reports for reasons other
than those listed may be furnished only the consumer's name,
address, place of employment and former addresses and places
of employment. 96 Consumer reporting agencies are required
91. The Act does not expressly require that the investigation cease
if the consumer withdraws his application, but the party ordering the
investigation will not want to pay for an unnecessary report. There is
no incentive to continue the investigation just to have something in the
files for future reference since adverse information in an investi-
gatory report must be reverified prior to reuse. FCRA § 16811. It
would be economic folly to pay for information which might never be
used and which would have to be reverified if it were used. In addi-
tion, the entire requirement of notification of the use of an investiga-
tory report would be senseless if the consumer could not stop such a re-
port by withdrawing his application. Ignoring a consumer's desire not
to be the subject of such a report would be contrary to the Act's express
concern for the consumer's right to privacy. FCRA § 1681 (a) (4) and
§ 1681 (b).
92. Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 23 MAINE L. REV. 253,
261 (1971).
93. Id.
94. See Part IV A infra.
95. FCRA § 1681b.
96. FCRA § 1681f.
[Vol. 56:819
FCRA
to maintain reasonable procedures designed to limit disclosure
of consumer reports to the specified purposes. 7 Criminal pen-
alties may be imposed for obtaining information from a con-
sumer reporting agency under false pretenses98 or for knowingly
supplying information to unauthorized persons. 0
Other than for one of the specific purposes cited above, ac-
cess to consumer files is limited to those having a "legitimate
business need for the information in connection with a business
transaction involving the consumer."1 00 An FTC advisory opin-
ion interprets this to mean that market researchers, attorneys
investigating prospective jurors, and persons compiling black-
lists and protective bulletins can no longer be granted access to
consumer files.' 0 These individuals cannot show a "legitimate
business need" because their need for information does not arise
from a "business transaction involving the consumer." On the
other hand, a person trying to collect a debt or trace an abscond-
ing debtor does have a need for information growing out of a
"business transaction involving the consumer," and the FTC
states that access to consumer reports should be granted to these
individuals. 0 2
I. THE INJUmR CoNsuMR's LEGAL REMEDIES
The FCRA creates a civil remedy for either willful or negli-
gent noncompliance with the requiremens of the Act. 0 3 In an
action for willful noncompliance the consumer can recover
punitive damages, 0 4 while recovery for negligent noncompliance
is limited to actual damages.' 0 5 Costs and reasonable attorney's
fees will be allowed for both actions. 00 Actions under state law
for defamation, invasion of privacy and negligence are still avail-
able to the consumer, but such actions may not be based on in-
formation disclosed in accordance with the requirements of the
Act. 0 7 However, this grant of immunity does not apply where
97. FCRA § 1681e(a).
98. FCRA § 1681q.
99. FCRA § 1681r.
100. FCRA § 1681b(3) (E).
101. 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUME 11,304 at 59,787 (1971).
102. Id. at 59, 786.
103. FCRA § 1681n (willful noncompliance); FCRA § 1681o (neg-
ligent noncompliance).
104. FCRA § 1681n.
105. FCRA § 1681o.
106. FCRA § 1681n; FCRA § 1681o.
107. FCRA § 1681h(e).
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false information is supplied with malice or willful intent to in-
jure. 08
Since most consumer injuries will be the result of negligent
rather than willful conduct, the injured consumer will usually
rely on an action for negligent noncompliance to recover his
losses. It would be appropriate for the court in such actions to
place upon the defendant the burden of producing evidence
relating to the negligence question.10 9 The consumer reporting
agency usually will be in control of this crucial evidence and
the burden of production would have the effect of "smoking out"
such evidence.1 0 Absent this procedural advantage, it is un-
likely that actions for negligent noncompliance will be an
effective remedy for injured consumers.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE FCRA AS A PROGRAM
OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
The adequacy of the FCRA as a program of consumer pro-
tection must be measured by its effectiveness in solving the two
major problems created by the consumer reporting industry:
invasion of privacy and inaccurate reports.
A. THE ADEQUACY OF THE PRIVACY SAFEGUARDS
The FCRA's requirement that access to consumer reports
be restricted to those who intend to use the reports for one of
the purposes specified in the Act"' should provide increased
protection for the consumer's privacy. 12 However, the Act is
deficient in that it fails to place restrictions on the kinds of in-
formation the consumer reporting agencies can gather and sell.
It has been reported that for certain purposes the industry
gathers information on such highly personal matters as the
subject's hair style"13 and whether he is living under a common
108. Id.
109. See Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 Burr. L. Rsv. 1
(1951).
110. Id. at 7, 9; see generally W. PaossER, THE LAW OF TORTS 208-35
(4th ed. 1971). Cf. Schroeder v. City & County Say. Bank, 293 N.Y.
370, 57 N.E.2d 842 (1944).
111. FCRA § 1681b.
112. For a criticism of the program see Countryman, The Diminish-
ing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEXAS
L. REv. 837, 866-67 (1971). See also Alschuler, A Different View of Pri-
vacy, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 872 (1971).
113. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 6 (Midwest ed.).
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law marriage.1 4 The industry also reports on the subject's po-
litical activities for certain purposes,"1 5 a practice that could
have a chilling effect on consumer participation in this consti-
tutionally protected activity. Consumer spokesmen argued be-
fore Congressional committees that reporting such information
is an unjustifiable invasion of privacy and proposed that the in-
dustry be restricted to reporting only information "reasonably
relevant""10 to the purpose for which the report is to be used.
Neither the proposed relevancy requirements nor any other re-
striction on kinds of information that can be reported was in-
cluded in the FCRA.117 It is a fundamental weakness in the
privacy program of the Act that it permits agencies to gather
and report all kinds of information without regard to the impact
of such activitities on the individual's need for privacy or the
chilling effect such activities may have on the exercise of con-
stitutionally protected rights. A restriction should be added to
the Act to deal with this problem, but it should probably not
take the form of a relevancy requirement.
A relevancy requirement would not preclude agencies from
gathering and reporting much of the information that critics of
the industry believe should not be reported. Information con-
cerning a person's private life is in many instances relevant to
the purpose for which the report is sought. For example, auto-
mobile insurers have established that among the factors which
indicate a higher than average loss potential for an individual
are undesirable associates, poor morals, an antagonistic and
antisocial temperament and living under a common law marriage
arrangement. 18  Since each of these factors is related to risk,
a relevancy requirement would not bar the reporting of this
highly personal information. Similarly, if merchants could prove
that people involved in radical politics do not pay their bills, a
relevancy requirement would not preclude the gathering and re-
114. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 516.
115. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 177-79.
116. This was the language of an alternative House Bill regulating
the consumer reporting agencies. H.R. REP. No. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 54 (1970).
117. The Act states that its purpose is to require practices which
are "fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidential-
ity, accuracy, -relevancy, and proper utilization" of the information fur-
nished by reporting agencies. FCRA § 1681(b) (emphasis added).
However, no other provision in the Act mentions relevancy, and the
FTC has issued an advisory opinion stating there is no restriction as to
relevancy in the FCRA. 4 CCH CoNsuriAn CsEDrr GU IE S 11,313 at
59,806 (1971).
118. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 515-16.
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porting of information on the political views of credit appli-
cants. Perhaps some wholly nonessential information is being
reported which a relevancy requirement could eliminate, but
this would nevertheless be an inadequate safeguard considering
the fundamental nature of an individual's right to privacy.
A more effective guaranty of consumer privacy would be
an amendment prohibiting the reporting of certain information
regardless of its relevance, such as information as to the sub-
ject's race, religion or political affiliations.' 1 9 Authority could
be delegated to an administrative agency to expand the cate-
gories of prohibited information in accordance with a purpose of
prohibiting commerce in information which is essentially private
or is likely to have a chilling effect on constitutionally pro-
tected rights if reported. The fact that insurers, creditors or
others find certain information useful in their decision-making
process could be considered in determining whether to allow the
agencies to report it. However, a finding that the information
was useful should not be dispositive here, as it would be under
a relevance test.
B. THE ADEQUACY OF THE PROGRAM TO PROTECT THE CONSUMER
FROM INACCURATE REPORTS
The FCRA approach to protecting the consumer from inac-
curate reports has been criticized for seeking to correct inac-
curate information only after it has been reported rather than
attempting to prevent the reporting of inaccurate information. 20
The Act's major mechanisms for dealing with inaccurate reports
are remedial rather than preventive and begin to function
only after the consumer has been harmed or inconvenienced by
an inaccurate report.121 After an adverse decision on his appli-
cation, notice is sent to the consumer. 2 At this point, if the
119. A ban on gathering and reporting this type of information was
proposed by the American Civil Liberties Union during the hearings in
the House. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 231.
120. One commentator has described the approach as "monstrous":
The credit reporting agencies succeeded in selling Congress the
monstrous proposition that they should remain free to collect
and disseminate erroneous dossiers-subject only to liability for
malice or wilful intent to injure-and that the burden should
fall upon their subjects to come forward and correct errors.
Countryman, supra note 112, at 865.
121. The exception is the investigatory report which requires notice
to the consumer prior to the commencement of the investigation. See
text accompanying notes 86-91 supra.
122. FCRA § 1681m(a).
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consumer discovers the error and so informs the agency, it is re-
quired to correct the report.12 3  The Act then requires the cor-
rected file to be resubmitted to the user'2 4 on the assumption
that he will reverse his adverse decision upon receipt of the
corrected report. Congress adopted a remedial rather than an
effective preventive program because the latter was strongly
opposed by the industry on the basis of its allegedly prohibitive
cost.12 5 Preventive measures tend to be expensive because they
must be applied to all files and procedures. The cost advan-
tage of the FCRA remedial program is that remedial action is
necessary on only a small percentage of files.
If consumer reports involved only credit or insurance appli-
cations the Act's remedial approach to the problem of inaccurate
reports would perhaps provide the consumer with sufficient pro-
tection. Presumably creditors and insurers solicit customers
and will accept every satisfactory applicant If a corrected re-
port indicates that a consumer is in fact a good risk, a creditor
or insurer would generally be willing to reverse a prior deci-
sion based upon an inaccurate report and grant the consumer
the credit or insurance he desires. Thus, where insurance and
credit are concerned, the remedial mechanisms of the FCRA
should usually rectify any harm suffered by a consumer as a re-
sult of an inaccurate report.12 6 However, if a consumer has lost
an employment opportunity because of an inaccurate report,
the remedial mechanisms of the Act would not seem to offer the
consumer the same degree of protection. Unlike creditors or in-
surers, employers have limits on the number of qualified appli-
cants they can accept at any time. Consequently, once an em-
ployment opportunity is lost, there is no assurance that it could
123. FCRA § 1681i(a).
124. FCRA § 1681i(d).
125. Discussions of cost were heard throughout the hearings. See,
e.g., House Hearings, supra note 2, at 222, 227. Among the preventive
measures that were strongly opposed by the industry because of their
cost was a proposed requirement that all public record information be
current as of seven days prior to the report (id. at 117), and a require-
ment that those parties who report past due accounts and collection
problems also promptly report any changes in status of these accounts
(id- at 119, 147).
126. There is a possibility of an additional loss that could not be
remedied in these cases. As an example, in the interim period when
the consumer is waiting for his file to be corrected, he could be
forced to pay high risk insurance premiums and only when the report is
corrected would he be able to buy insurance at average rates. The
issue of compensation for these interim expenses was not raised in the
committee hearings. However, such losses might be too small to be a
source of concern.
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be regained if a corrected report were submitted to the prospec-
tive employer. Thus, where pre-employment reports are con-
cerned, additional preventive measures are necessary to minimize
the possibility that employment decisions will be made on the ba-
sis of inaccurate information.
This need for stronger preventive measures where employ-
ment reports are concerned is recognized to a limited extent in
the Act. As was indicated previously,1 27 when public record in-
formation is furnished for employment purposes the agency
must either notify the consumer that adverse public record in-
formation is being reported or it must maintain strict proce-
dures to ensure that the information is complete and current. 128
However, this preventive program could be significantly im-
proved. A simple and inexpensive preventive measure would be
to require the submission of a copy of the pre-employment report
to the subject for verification before the report is furnished to
the employer.129  Since the consumer rather than the agency
would do the needed verification, the only expenses to the agency
would be for copying, mailing and making corrections.'3 0 Since
the reporting agencies are presently liable for correction ex-
penses,' 3 ' this plan would simply advance the time when they
are incurred. The cost of photocopying the report already pre-
pared for the employer and mailing it to the consumer would
be minimal. This extra preventive measure would increase the
preparation time for pre-employment reports, but surely the con-
sumer's vital interest in securing employment, which is de-
pendent on the accuracy of such reports, outweighs this fac-
tor.
127. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
128. FCRA § 1681k(2).
129. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 82 (1971) requires that a copy of a
credit report be submitted to the consumer before it is furnished to a
third party. The Oklahoma Attorney General has announced he intends
to enforce this requirement although it is stricter than what is required
by the FCRA. 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE § 99,257 (1972). State
law is preempted by the FCRA only to the extdnt such law is incon-
sistent with the requirements of the FCRA. FCRA § 1681t. The Okla-
homa Attorney General's position appears to be that statutes stricter
than the FCRA are not inconsistent with it.
130. Agencies are allowed to withhold the sources of information
in an investigative consumer report from the subject of the report.
FCRA § 1681g(a) (2). If the agencies feel the need to excise the names
of sources from the copy of the report to be sent to the subject under
this plan, this would increase their costs, but such increase would not
be significant.
131. FCRA § 1681j.
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A preventive program similar to the foregoing could not ap-
propriately be applied to credit reports since credit reporting is
done largely by telephone or teletype, a practice that would be
impossible if every report had to be cleared with the consumer
prior to submission to the creditor. Also, credit is sought much
more frequently than employment and thus notification costs
could become prohibitive here. 1 32  Given the additional factor
that creditors want customers and would be willing to restore
credit if a mistake were corrected, there is probably no need for
a preventive program to be applied to credit reports. However,
the reasons for not applying preventive measures to credit
reports do not apply to pre-employment reports. Congress may
not have appreciated the differing situations of a person refused
credit on the basis of an inaccurate report and one refused em-
ployment. The potential for irreparable harm to a person de-
nied employment is a persuasive reason for creating a preventive
program to upgrade the quality of pre-employment reports.
V. CONCLUSION
The FCRA offers the consumer substantial protection. The
consumer victimized by an inaccurate report or injured by an in-
vasion of privacy is no longer without a remedy against the
consumer reporting agency. However, restrictions should be im-
posed on the investigation and reporting of essentially private
information and additional preventive measures should be re-
quired of those preparing pre-employment reports. If the Act
were amended in these two respects, it would be a much more
effective instrument for consumer protection.
132. However, this procedure is required in Oklahoma. See note
129 supra.
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